Prompt without a sign-in
An approval request appears when the employee is not actively accessing the named account or application.
An MFA fatigue attack sends repeated authentication prompts in the hope that a user will approve one to stop the disruption or because they assume it is legitimate.
Use this guide to turn the threat into a clear employee decision, a safe practice scenario, and a reporting step your organization can support.
Plain-English definition • Warning signs • Safe simulation ideas • Reporting practice
An MFA fatigue attack sends repeated authentication prompts in the hope that a user will approve one to stop the disruption or because they assume it is legitimate.
The prompt may come from a real authentication system. The suspicious condition is that the employee did not initiate the sign-in or does not recognize the request.
Source: CISA Phishing Guidance
No single clue proves that a message is malicious. Teach employees to combine the request, sender, business context, destination, and available verification route before acting.
An approval request appears when the employee is not actively accessing the named account or application.
Multiple prompts arrive over a short period, sometimes followed by a call or message claiming to explain them.
A supposed support person asks the user to accept a prompt, share a code, or keep retrying.
| Moment | Employee action | Program preparation |
|---|---|---|
| Before acting | Reject the unexplained request and report it through the known security or support channel rather than approving it to make the prompts stop. | Publish the authentic contact, application, or reporting route somewhere employees can reach without using the message. |
| When uncertain | Pause the request and report it through the approved channel with enough context for review. | Explain what the response team needs and how employees will know that their report was received. |
| After an interaction | Stop, contact the responsible team promptly, and describe the action taken without hiding the mistake. | Provide a well-known response route and avoid communications that discourage early reporting. |
Source: NIST: Recognizing, verifying, and reporting phishing
Choose one learning objective per exercise. Use fictional people, organizations, accounts, payments, documents, and events, and test the reporting route before sending to employees.
Use screenshots or a tabletop to practice the reject-and-report decision without generating live prompts.
Discuss how an attacker might follow repeated prompts with support impersonation.
Test whether employees know where to report and which account, time, and device details are useful.
Write down the mfa fatigue attacks clue being practiced, the expected action, the authorized audience, and the owner of follow-up.
Test the independent verification route, message-reporting option, response handoff, and employee support path from a representative account.
Check delivery, links, landing content, accessibility, event records, automated inspection, stop conditions, and the explanation employees will receive.
Reconcile intended recipients, successful deliveries, unique employee events, verified reports, response handling, and completed follow-up before drawing conclusions.
Source: NIST SP 800-50 Rev. 1: Building a Cybersecurity and Privacy Learning Program
Record actual counts and denominators for delivery, unique recipient events, reports, and follow-up. Separate automated email inspection and repeat events where the available evidence supports doing so.
A mfa fatigue attacks exercise samples one scenario under one set of conditions. It does not establish an employee's intent, overall security awareness, or likelihood of responding the same way to a real attack.
Use findings to improve the real workflow: clearer verification instructions, easier reporting, faster response handling, better role-specific training, or a business control that reduces reliance on email alone.
Common questions about Phishmake's features, onboarding, and support, answered to help you get started with confidence.
They should reject it and use the known security or support route to report the event, following the organization's documented instructions.
Approval may authorize a sign-in the employee did not initiate. The safe response is to reject and report rather than interact until the request is understood.
It can be practiced when the scenario is authorized, proportionate, and tied to a real reporting or verification process. Do not create real authentication prompts or intentionally disrupt an employee's account or device. Use fictional examples or a controlled non-production environment.
Review successful delivery, unique employee events, reports, response handling, and completed follow-up. Include scenario difficulty and operating context, and do not treat a click or report as a complete measure of employee risk.
Use Phishmake to run controlled employee simulations, review campaign activity, assign relevant training, and keep follow-up records in one workflow.