Reset not initiated
The employee receives a recovery or password-change message when they did not request one.
Password reset phishing imitates an account-expiry, security, or recovery notice to send the recipient to a deceptive sign-in or reset process.
Use this guide to turn the threat into a clear employee decision, a safe practice scenario, and a reporting step your organization can support.
Plain-English definition • Warning signs • Safe simulation ideas • Reporting practice
Password reset phishing imitates an account-expiry, security, or recovery notice to send the recipient to a deceptive sign-in or reset process.
The message exploits a familiar administrative task. Employees need a known route to account settings and support so they do not have to decide based on the email's branding alone.
Source: CISA Phishing Guidance
No single clue proves that a message is malicious. Teach employees to combine the request, sender, business context, destination, and available verification route before acting.
The employee receives a recovery or password-change message when they did not request one.
The notice threatens immediate lockout or data loss and provides only one message-controlled route.
The page asks for an existing password, multiple codes, recovery information, or repeated authentication.
| Moment | Employee action | Program preparation |
|---|---|---|
| Before acting | Close the message and open the organization's known account portal or contact the approved support route independently. | Publish the authentic contact, application, or reporting route somewhere employees can reach without using the message. |
| When uncertain | Pause the request and report it through the approved channel with enough context for review. | Explain what the response team needs and how employees will know that their report was received. |
| After an interaction | Stop, contact the responsible team promptly, and describe the action taken without hiding the mistake. | Provide a well-known response route and avoid communications that discourage early reporting. |
Source: NIST: Recognizing, verifying, and reporting phishing
Choose one learning objective per exercise. Use fictional people, organizations, accounts, payments, documents, and events, and test the reporting route before sending to employees.
Use a controlled message that leads only to education and never accepts a password.
Ask employees to locate account settings through the normal application or company portal.
Rehearse reporting a reset notification the employee did not initiate.
Write down the password reset phishing clue being practiced, the expected action, the authorized audience, and the owner of follow-up.
Test the independent verification route, message-reporting option, response handoff, and employee support path from a representative account.
Check delivery, links, landing content, accessibility, event records, automated inspection, stop conditions, and the explanation employees will receive.
Reconcile intended recipients, successful deliveries, unique employee events, verified reports, response handling, and completed follow-up before drawing conclusions.
Source: NIST SP 800-50 Rev. 1: Building a Cybersecurity and Privacy Learning Program
Record actual counts and denominators for delivery, unique recipient events, reports, and follow-up. Separate automated email inspection and repeat events where the available evidence supports doing so.
A password reset phishing exercise samples one scenario under one set of conditions. It does not establish an employee's intent, overall security awareness, or likelihood of responding the same way to a real attack.
Use findings to improve the real workflow: clearer verification instructions, easier reporting, faster response handling, better role-specific training, or a business control that reduces reliance on email alone.
Common questions about Phishmake's features, onboarding, and support, answered to help you get started with confidence.
Employees can open the known account portal independently or contact the established support route to confirm and complete the task.
The safer design avoids credential fields entirely or prevents entry before it occurs. The exercise should not collect password-like data.
It can be practiced when the scenario is authorized, proportionate, and tied to a real reporting or verification process. Do not expire, reset, lock, or alter real accounts. Never collect passwords, authentication codes, recovery answers, sessions, or production identity data.
Review successful delivery, unique employee events, reports, response handling, and completed follow-up. Include scenario difficulty and operating context, and do not treat a click or report as a complete measure of employee risk.
Use Phishmake to run controlled employee simulations, review campaign activity, assign relevant training, and keep follow-up records in one workflow.