Familiar route, unfamiliar result
A saved address or normally trusted path produces a different domain, page design, language, or sign-in flow.
Pharming redirects a user toward a deceptive website even when they believe they are navigating to a legitimate service.
Use this guide to turn the threat into a clear employee decision, a safe practice scenario, and a reporting step your organization can support.
Plain-English definition • Warning signs • Safe simulation ideas • Reporting practice
Pharming redirects a user toward a deceptive website even when they believe they are navigating to a legitimate service.
Unlike a typical phishing link, the deception may involve name resolution, device settings, a compromised site, or another redirect. Employees cannot be expected to diagnose the mechanism, but they can report an unexpected destination or certificate warning.
Source: CISA Phishing Guidance
No single clue proves that a message is malicious. Teach employees to combine the request, sender, business context, destination, and available verification route before acting.
A saved address or normally trusted path produces a different domain, page design, language, or sign-in flow.
The browser indicates that the connection or identity of the site cannot be verified.
A service asks for authentication, recovery, payment, or personal details at an unusual point in the workflow.
| Moment | Employee action | Program preparation |
|---|---|---|
| Before acting | Stop using the unexpected page and contact the known support or security route from another trusted channel; do not bypass browser warnings. | Publish the authentic contact, application, or reporting route somewhere employees can reach without using the message. |
| When uncertain | Pause the request and report it through the approved channel with enough context for review. | Explain what the response team needs and how employees will know that their report was received. |
| After an interaction | Stop, contact the responsible team promptly, and describe the action taken without hiding the mistake. | Provide a well-known response route and avoid communications that discourage early reporting. |
Source: NIST: Recognizing, verifying, and reporting phishing
Choose one learning objective per exercise. Use fictional people, organizations, accounts, payments, documents, and events, and test the reporting route before sending to employees.
Use fictional browser examples to practice noticing an unexpected destination and warning.
Discuss what an employee should do if a bookmarked service suddenly looks or behaves differently.
Practice capturing the time, expected service, visible address, and warning without entering information.
Write down the pharming clue being practiced, the expected action, the authorized audience, and the owner of follow-up.
Test the independent verification route, message-reporting option, response handoff, and employee support path from a representative account.
Check delivery, links, landing content, accessibility, event records, automated inspection, stop conditions, and the explanation employees will receive.
Reconcile intended recipients, successful deliveries, unique employee events, verified reports, response handling, and completed follow-up before drawing conclusions.
Source: NIST SP 800-50 Rev. 1: Building a Cybersecurity and Privacy Learning Program
Record actual counts and denominators for delivery, unique recipient events, reports, and follow-up. Separate automated email inspection and repeat events where the available evidence supports doing so.
A pharming exercise samples one scenario under one set of conditions. It does not establish an employee's intent, overall security awareness, or likelihood of responding the same way to a real attack.
Use findings to improve the real workflow: clearer verification instructions, easier reporting, faster response handling, better role-specific training, or a business control that reduces reliance on email alone.
Common questions about Phishmake's features, onboarding, and support, answered to help you get started with confidence.
No. Employees should not be asked to diagnose network attacks. Teach them to stop and report unexpected destinations, sign-in behavior, or browser warnings.
Both can lead to deceptive websites, but pharming emphasizes redirection of the user's navigation rather than relying only on a deceptive message link.
It can be practiced when the scenario is authorized, proportionate, and tied to a real reporting or verification process. Do not alter DNS, device settings, certificates, bookmarks, hosts files, or production traffic for an awareness exercise. Use static examples or an isolated lab.
Review successful delivery, unique employee events, reports, response handling, and completed follow-up. Include scenario difficulty and operating context, and do not treat a click or report as a complete measure of employee risk.
Use Phishmake to run controlled employee simulations, review campaign activity, assign relevant training, and keep follow-up records in one workflow.